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CASES NOTED
court, that the plaintiff cannot recover because she ran and fell and then
suffered a heart attack, is without merit.
An interesting inconsistency in the law of Pennsylvania is illustrated
by the case of Gillam v. Hague3 ' where damages were recovered for the loss
in value of a horse frightened by an automobile. The dissent inferred,
that since similar evidcntiary and causal problems appear in both this and
the instant case, Mr. Bosley would have recovered damages if his horse,
and not his wife, had collapsed.
Justice Musmanno concluded that, since the majority admits: (1)
medical evidence proved that Mrs. Bosley's heart disability was a direct result
of the bull's chase; (2) Mr. Andrews was a trespasser by the actions of his
cattle; then, under the law of quare clausum fregit, liability should follow
for all ensuing damages.
Mr. Andrews owed a duty to his neighbors to keep his cattle off their
land. The breach of this duty resulted in Mrs. Bosley sustaining a heart
attack. It is difficult to see why the proximate cause of the injury was any-
thing but the fright created by the bull's chase. Certainly it was forsee-
able that wild cattle might frighten those who attempted to constrain
then. Applying their predecessors' reasoning, the court refused the plain-
tiff the right to redress at law because she was fortunate enough not to be
struck by the defendant's bull. Proof of impact has always been required
by the Pennsylvania courts in order to enable the plaintiff to take his case
to the jury. The only reason presented by the court for denying recovery
was the fear of setting a precedent that would eventually create a flood
of unjust claims. The practical experience gained from observing the rec-
ords of jurisdictions allowing recovery, unquestionably wrecks any possible
foundation for maintaining this view. Our judicial system is mature
enough to separate the wheat from the chaff before any damage can be
done. A blind adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis destroys the very
basis of judge-made tort law. The judicial policy of our modern courts
must be flexible in order to conform to the needs and advancements of
society.
LAWRENCE J. SHONGUT
GUEST STATUTE - CHANGE OF STATUS
Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's automobile, was injured after
protesting about defendant's improper driving and demanding to be let out.
Held, plaintiff's reasonable protest and demand to leave the automobile
changed her status from guest to that of a passenger against her will. There-
31. 39 Pa. Super. 547 (1909).
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fore, proof of gross negligence as required by the Florida Guest Statute1 was
not necessary and recovery could have been based on a finding of simple
negligence. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So.2d 110 (Fla. App. 1958).
The precise issue in the instant case had not been previously decided
in Florida and only two other states2 have passed upon this particular
issue. It is generally agreed that a mere protest without a demand to
leave does not change the status of the guest or the degree of care
required by the driver,3 In Washington it was held, on the basis of the guest
statute,' that "once a guest always a guest" 5 and a change of status could
not be brought about by a protest of improper driving and a demand to
be let out." The court treated the enumerated exceptions of the statute
as impliedly excluding all other invited riders from its exceptions.7 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Hill resorted to the rationale that it is more
desirable that there be an "occasional injustice than a wholesale perversion
of justice"8 by collusive law suits against insurance companies.
A contrary result has been reached in Georgia where it is recognized that
a guest becomes a passenger against his will when the driver fails to heed
a demand to be let out of the automobile., The court reasoned that the
host and guest had voluntarily engaged in a common endeavor and the
guest assumed the risk of ordinary negligence. Once the guest displayed his
desire to withdraw from the journey, he could no longer be said to have
I. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1957): "No person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death
or loss, in case of accident unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor
vehicle ..... "
2. Akins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash.2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949); Anderson v.
Williams, 95 Ga. App. 684, 98 S.E.2d 579 (1957).
3. Wachtel v. Bloch, 43 Ga. App. 756, 160 S.E. 97 (1931); Schlater v. Harbin,
273 Mich. 465, 263 NV. 431 (1935); Hayes v. Brower, 39 Wash.2d 372, 235 P.2d
482 (1951). See Arnot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1448.
4.WASn. Rrv. CODE §46.08.080 (1952): "No person transported by the owner
or operator of a motor vehicle as an invited guest or licensee, without payment for such
transportation, shall have a cause of action for damage against such owner or operator
for injuries, death, or loss, in case of accident, unless the accident was intentional on
the part of the owner or operator; provided, that this section shall not relieve any owner
or operator of a motor vehicle from liablity while it is being demonstrated to a prospective
purchaser." This statute was later amended to allow recovery for the driver's intoxication
or gross negligence: LAws or WASH, ch.132 §132, §1 (1957).
5. Akins v. Hemphill, 33 Wash.2d 735, 738, 207 P.2d 195, 197 (1949) (dissenting
opinion which commented on the majority opinion statement: "when she became a
guest of the respondent driver, she became such for the entire journey").
6. Akins v. Hemphill, supra note 5, in which three justices dissented. See also the
dictum to the same effect in Bateman v. Ursich, 36 Wash,2d 729, 220 P.Zd 314 (1950);
Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wash.2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943)..
.... 7. In' Bateman v. Ursich, supra note 6 at 735, 136 P.2d at 317; "The legislature,
ia .enacting the host'guest statute, saw fit to'specify only three exceptions: . . . . Under
:thes6.?-circumstances, we have no authority to make additional exceptions to those
enuierated in the statute."
8. Akins v. H-emphill, 33 Wash.2d 735,739, 207 P.2d 195,197 (1949) (con-
curring opinion).
9. Anderson v. Williams, 95 Go. App. 684. 98 S.E.2d 579 (1957); Blanchard
Ogletree, 41 Ca. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1929).
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CASES NOTED
assumed against his will the risk of the driver's negligence. 10 In other
states where the change in status was not specificially pleaded, the courts
have treated the guest's protests and demand to be allowed to leave the
automobile as matters to be considered in determining the degree of the
driver's negligence."
The court in the instant case adopted the Georgia view and treated
the status of the plaintiff as having changed from a guest to a passenger
against her will. 1' Consequently, the defendant was under a duty to use
ordinary care and became liable for simple negligence. A distinction was
drawn as to demands to leave the automobile for purposes of convenience'
3
and demands to leave because of improper driving and "a feeling of
impending disaster";1 4 the latter being required to recover for simple
negligence.
The Washington court was apparently concerned with the possibility
of collusion.' " It is unsound reasoning to deny recovery to those otherwise
entitled to it simply because of the existence of potential chicanery. It
should be noted that the enumerated exceptions to the Washington Guest
Statute are also susceptible to collusion. 0 The court in the present decision,
without offending the Florida Guest Statute, 7 has logically created a reason-
able exception to it. However, the limitation that the passenger's demand
to be let out of the automobile must be motivated by a fear of impending
injury"'8 does not appear to be sound in principle. Since the essence of the
reasoning is that the passenger is riding against his will,'0 a passenger's
objective manifestation of his desire to withdraw from the trip should suffice
to create the change in status irrespective of the passenger's motive. A
driver's refusal to let the passenger out of the automobile has been
construed on occasion as an unlawful restraint upon the passenger's
freedom.'0 Ironically, a person riding in an automobile against his wishes
10. Ibid.
11. Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn. 169, 147 A. 568 (1929); Jones v: Melvin, 293
Mass. 9, 199 N.E. 392 (1936); Manzer v. Eder, 263 Mich. 107, 248 N.W. 563 -(1933);
Worcester v. McClurkin, 174 Va. 221, 5 SE.2d 509 (1939).
12. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So.2d 110, 116 (Fla. App. 1958). -.
13. Vance v. Grohe, 223 Iowa 1109, 274 N. W. 902- (1937)(a change in status
was not recognized where demand to get out of the automobile was for the purpose of
saving time).
14. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So.2d 110, 117 (Fla. App. 1958). The court distiuguished
Vance v. Grohe, supra note 13, from the instant case.
15. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143,155, 53 P.2d 615,620. See also cases cited
note 6 sufra.
16. See notes 4 and 7 supra. The host and guest could falsely testify that. the guest
was a prospective purchaser or had paid for the tran'portation.
17. For an analysis of exceptions to guest statutes see Annots. 82 A.L.R. 1365,
95 A.L.R. 1180. For exceptions to the Florida Guest Statute see Miller v. Morse Auto
Rentals Inc., 106 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1958); Peery v. Mershon, 149 Fla. 351, 5 So.2d
694 (1942).
18. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So.2d 110, 117 (Fla. App. 1958).
19. Id. at 116.
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may be considered a prisoner21 in one state and a guest2 2 in another.
The unsoundness of treating the unwilling rider as a guest within the
meaning of the automobile guest statutes becomes apparent when the
rider's freedom is viewed as being unlawfully restrained without his
consent. Regardless of the possible alternate remedy of false imprisonment,
a driver should not be allowed to negligently injure a passenger without
incurring liability when the passenger is riding against his will.
Daniel H. James
DIVORCE - LIABILITY OF THE HUSBAND'S
ESTATE TO PAY ALIMONY
The plaintiff sought an order requiring the ancillary administrator of
her deceased husband's estate to make alimony payments. The divorce decree
and prior property settlement provided that payinents "would cease upon
her death or remarriage." Held, where the decree or property settlement
expressly provides for the continuance of the payments "until the death of
the wife or her remarriage" the husband's estate remains liable. Johnson
v. Every, 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957).
Under the common law, the obligation to pay alimony is regarded as
a personal one which terminates upon the death of either spouse.' In the
absence of a statute2 or an agreement between the parties, the rule adopted
by the majority of courts in the case of an absolute divorce is that the
death of the husband terminates the right of the wife to receive alimony
payments.8
20. Cieplinski v. Severn, 269 Mass. 261, 168 N.E. 722 (1929) (driving past street
where plaintiff demanded to be let out of automobile entitled plaintiff to at least nominal
damages for false imprisonment); Jacobson v. Sorenson, 183 Minn. 425, 236 N.W. 922
(1931) (taking plaintiff for an involuntary ride for the purpose of "telling her off"
constituted false imprisonment).
21. Ibid.
22. Akins v. Hemphill, 33 \Vash.2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
1. 19 C. J. Divorce § 633 (1920).
2. Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P.2d 247 (1935); Hale v. Hale,
108 W. Va. 337, 150 S.E. 748 (1929).
3. Roberts v. Iliggens, 122 Cal. App. 170, 9 P.2d 517 (1932); International
Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, Ili Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264 (1943) (dictum); Parsons v.
Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921); Underwood v. Underwood, 64
So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953); Berry v. Berry, 208 Ga. 285, 66 S.E.2d 336 (1951); Kramp v.
Kramp, 2 Ill. App. 2d 17, 117 N.E.2d 859 (1954); Re Yoss Estate, 237 Iowa 1092,
24 N.W.2d 399 (1946); Succession of Carter, 32 So.2d 44 (La. 1947); Poor v. Poor,
237 Mo. App. 74, 167 S.W.2d 471 (1942); N.h 4 orth, 339 Mo. 1226, 100
S.W.2d 582 (1936 SW Robertson v4 2 No. 455, 190 At. 709 (1937); Re
Crimley's Estate, 26 Misc. 901, 107 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Platt v. Davies,
82 Ohio App. 182, 77 N.E.2d 486 (1947); Snouffer v. Snouffer, 132 Ohio St. 617,
9 N.E.2d 621 (1937); Prime v. Prime, 172 Ore. 34, 139 P.2d 550 (1943); Re Watrous's
Estate, 10 Pa. 1. & C. 639 (1927), aff'd, 95 Pa. Super 11 (1927); Brandon v. Brandon,
175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940); Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E.Zd
605 (1954).
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